October 3, 2018

OFFICE OF THE HEARING EXAMINER
KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON

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REPORT AND DECISION

SUBJECT: Department of Permitting and Environmental Review file no. **PREA170313**

FOUR HORSEMEN BREWERY
Preliminary Determination Appeal

Location: 30221 148th Avenue SE, Kent

Appellants: **Donna Hinds-Scarimbolo, Dane Scarimbolo, and Dominique and Justin Torgerson**
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King County: Department of Permitting and Environmental Review
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS/DECISION:

Department's Preliminary Recommendation:	Deny appeal
Department's Final Recommendation:	Deny appeal
Examiner's Decision:	Grant appeal in part; deny appeal in part

EXAMINER PROCEEDINGS:

Hearing Opened:	September 6, 2018
Hearing Closed:	September 19, 2018

Participants at the public hearing and the exhibits offered and entered are listed in the attached minutes. A verbatim recording of the hearing is available in the Hearing Examiner's Office.

After hearing the witnesses' testimony and observing their demeanor, studying the exhibits admitted into evidence, and considering the parties' arguments and the relevant law, the examiner hereby makes the following findings, conclusions, and decision.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:

Overview

1. The operators of the Four Horsemen Brewery (Appellants) challenge a preliminary determination by the Department of Permitting and Environmental Review (DPER) that no tasting areas—no matter how limited in scope—are allowed in connection with a home occupation brewery. Although DPER is correct that the tasting area Appellants sought to operate exceeded the limited-scale uses allowed for a home occupation, DPER is incorrect that current law categorically prohibits all such home occupation tasting areas. Accordingly we grant, in part, Appellants' petition.

Background

2. Appellants, the four brewery operators, live in the residence on the subject property. They installed a brewery and tasting areas without the necessary permits. Code Enforcement received a complaint and began administrative proceedings. In response, Appellants began the permitting process. DPER informed them that while their brewery operations were likely legalizeable through the permit process, on-site home occupation tasting areas were prohibited, county-wide.

3. When, at or after a pre-application conference, DPER issues a preliminary determination that a proposed development is not permissible, an applicant has the option to appeal that determination to us. KCC 20.20.030.D. Appellants filed a timely challenge, and we went to hearing on September 6. We announced at the close of that hearing that we would hold the record open until September 19, to allow the parties to submit additional argument. With the record now closed, we turn to our analysis.

Analysis

4. The distinction between the way courts treat "facial" challenges versus "as-applied" challenges provides a useful framework for our analysis. Because DPER has adopted a blanket (facial) position "that it is not possible to condition a tasting room to be a limited use, subordinate and incidental to a residence," Ex. A16 at 002, we must reject DPER's position "unless there exists no set of circumstances in which" a tasting area can meet the home occupation standards. *Cf. Tunstall ex rel. Tunstall v. Bergeson*, 141 Wn.2d 201, 221, 5 P.3d 691 (2000). This also means that we devote less space to making detailed factual findings than we would if, for example, DPER had determined that while tasting areas were generally amenable to home occupation status, *specific* attributes of Appellants' operations went too far.

5. The current zoning code allows commercial breweries—along with any state-allowed tasting area for products produced on site—on Rural Area (RA) zoned properties. KCC 21A.08.080.B.3.g. However, such activities are only allowed on parcels of at least 4.5 acres. *Id.* at c. Appellants' property is approximately half the required size.

6. Home occupations and home industries do offer a "catch all" avenue for legalization. Certain uses, prohibited as the primary use of a residential property, may nonetheless be conducted by a resident(s) if certain criteria are met. DPER agrees that a brewery itself, if sufficiently limited, is amenable to home occupation treatment. Our question is whether DPER is correct that no tasting areas, no matter how limited, can be allowed as part of a home occupation brewery.

7. We render our decision in the shadow of pending code changes that would overhaul the standards for adult beverage businesses (including both breweries and tasting areas) and would exclude breweries and tasting areas from being eligible for home occupation status. Prop. Ord. 2018-0241. Yet a proposal is not a law, we decide cases based on the actual law, not on the law as it may become.

8. We start with the low-hanging fruit, before turning to the more involved analysis.

9. Appellants make multiple references to the comprehensive plan (Comp Plan). A county's comprehensive plan is a "guide" and "blueprint"; it is typically not appropriate for making specific land use decisions. *Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon*, 133 Wn.2d 861, 873–74, 947 P.2d 1208 (1997). The Comp Plan would be relevant in our consideration of a home *industry*, because a home industry here would require a conditional use permit, and the code controlling the conditional use analysis explicitly requires inquiry into whether a proposed use conflicts with the Comp Plan. KCC 21A.44.040.G. But today's case is about whether a tasting room is permissible as a home *occupation* under the current wording of KCC 21A.30.085, which does not incorporate any Comp Plan component. The Comp Plan may provide fodder for how Appellants' lobby Council to shape the proposed ordinance, but it does not impact our decision.[1]

10. Appellants next assert that they should be allowed a tasting room because the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board (Board) permits this without requiring an additional tasting room or retail license (on top of a brewery license), and so Appellants should be allowed to exercise these state-granted "privileges." WAC 314-20-015(1) ("A licensed brewer may sell: (a) Beer of its own production at retail on the brewery premises"); Ex. A16-002. That the Board may authorize something as a matter of state *licensing* law does not mean that the County allows (or has to allow) it as a matter of local *zoning* law.

[1] Even if the Comp Plan were relevant, Appellants' citation to ED-602.g would be unavailing. That subsection states that the County will "explore opportunities to support agricultural tourism and value-added program(s) related to the production of … specialty beverages (including beer, distilled beverages, and wine) in the county." The pending ordinance is the result of that exploration, via a King County Sammamish Valley Wine and Beverage Study released in September 2016. Prop. Ord. 208-0241. If Appellants do not like that result, they can lobby for an amendment to the legislation. But ED-602.g did not promise any specific result, only an exploration.

11. In the words of our most recent appellate decision interpreting the analogous question of whether a county must sanction marijuana businesses the Board accepts, "the fact that an activity can be licensed under state law does not mean that the activity must be allowed under local law." *Emerald Enterprises, LLC v. Clark County*, 2 Wn. App. 2d 794, 805, 413 P.3d 92 (2018). The Board's powers are "distinct from the County's zoning authority," and a Board license is "an additional requirement for opening a new business." *Id.* at 817, 806. We assume, for purposes of our discussion, that the Board would license any of the alternatives in today's discussion. Our question is what KCC Title 21A allows.

12. DPER argues that, if we decide that a tasting area can be allowed, DPER should have the discretion to decide whether that proposal should fit under the home occupation or home industry rubric. Ex. A16 at 004. DPER can *suggest* an appropriate avenue for legalizing something, and often DPER helpfully does just that. But where a party applies for *X*, DPER (and we) must analyze *X*. A home industry might be a viable alternative, if we decide that tasting cannot occur—in any form—in conjunction with a home occupation brewery. But DPER (and we) have to analyze the question actually asked. And here that involves a proposal for a brewery/tasting area as a home occupation, not as a home industry.

13. Our final preliminary point recognizes that DPER has been consistent in interpreting the code as barring tasting areas as a component of a home occupation brewery; its position here is not one crafted for an adversarial proceeding. Ex. D5. That would be important if we were determining whether (and how much) to grant DPER deference, given that courts accord more weight to agency interpretations that are consistent with that agency's prior administrative practice. *Skamania County v. Columbia River Gorge Com'n*, 144 Wn.2d 30, 43, 26 P.3d 241 (2001). But it is the examiner, not the agency, who gets any deference in today's case. *Durland v. San Juan County*, 174 Wn. App. 1, 11, 298 P.3d 757 (2012). Our rules reflect this: barring some special directive to the contrary, the examiner does not grant substantial weight or otherwise accord deference to agency determinations. Exam. R. XV.F.3.

14. Turning to the crux of the matter, DPER initially argues that—in addition to the specific, occupational requirements of KCC 21A.30.085—a would-be home occupier also has to meet the limitations coming directly from KCC chapter 21A.06's definitions, including "a limited-scale service or fabrication activity…subordinate to the primary use of the site as a residence" and being "[c]ustomarily associated with a principal use" and "[s]ubordinate and incidental to the principal use." KCC 21A.06.610, .013.

15. However, then DPER essentially reverses course and asserts that these definitional limits are actually no limits at all, and that if we allow any type of tasting area, all hell would break loose. *E.g.*, Ex. D1 at 005 (asserting that nothing would "prevent four fifteen-person conversion vans from arriving on site each hour, on the hour…and would not prevent the owners from using shuttle buses to ferry large groups of customers to the site"). Appellants unwittingly support DPER's argument, alleging that without a precise definition DPER is barred from establishing guidelines for what can be considered subordinate or limited-scale. Ex. A16 at 001. This adds fuel to DPER's claim that if we overturn its blanket interpretation that a tasting area is never allowed as a home

occupation, DPER can set no limits, Exhibit A16-001, and the sky (truly) would be falling.

16. The answer is that DPER's first point is correct, rendering the second point moot.

17. We were initially skeptical that a general definition would add any limitations on top of those specifically enumerated in the operative section, KCC 21A.30.085. That is, as long as one meets KCC 21A.30.085's checklist, anything that does not violate one of those specific restrictions is legal. Yet after more contemplation, we agree with DPER that KCC chapter 21A.06 adds operative restrictions. Because KCC 21A.30.085 starts off (underscore added) by noting that residents "may conduct one or more home occupations as accessory activities, under the following provisions," the limitations included in the definitions of "home occupation" and "accessory activity" are explicitly incorporated into .085.

18. The statutory interpretation principle that a "general statutory provision normally yields to a more specific statutory provision," *Western Plaza, LLC v. Tison*, 184 Wn.2d 702, 712, 364 P.3d 76 (2015), still applies. So, for example, in answering the question of how many employees could work in the business or how long operating hours can be, and still qualify as "limited-scale" and "accessory" to a residential use, we would look solely to KCC 21A.30.085's detailed answers, and not to KCC 21A.06.013's and .610's general principles. But the definitions remain functional.

19. Turning to those definitions, DPER argues that Appellants' tasting area would be a "sales-based" business and thus not allowed, given KCC 21A.06.610's definition of home occupations as limited-scale service or fabrication activities. Ex. D1 at 004. DPER's argument is accurate for home occupations in the Urban Residential (R) and Urban Reserve (UR) zones, where sales are limited to mail order, electronic, and sales to patrons who receive services onsite. KCC 21A.30.080.G. However the code applicable to Rural Area (RA) home occupations explicitly adds to this list sales of "[i]tems grown, produced or fabricated on-site." KCC 21A.30.080.K. That specific allowance trumps the general prohibition. Appellants produce their beer on their RA-zoned site, and provided they sell only what they produce on site, this particular component creates no prohibition.

20. Whether Appellants' specific activities actually qualify as "limited-scale" is discussed below. But DPER argues that that there are certain activities that simply cannot be considered "limited-scale," even if an applicant could demonstrate compliance with all the requirements of KCC 21A.30.085. That is correct, insofar as subsection J lists several uses the Council has determined "by the nature of their operation or investment, tend to increase beyond the limits permitted for home occupations" and therefore "shall not be permitted as home occupations." On that list are lodgings, dry cleaning, and certain automotive services, automotive wrecking services and tow-in parking lots. Most recently, the Council added marijuana-related businesses to the list. Ord. 17710 at § 11 (2013). The Council appears poised to do this again for breweries/tasting rooms in the proposed ordinance 2018-0241.

21. DPER offers sound arguments for why, by the nature of its operations, a tasting room tends to increase beyond the limits permitted for home occupations and therefore *should* be prohibited from being part of a home occupation. Given the current legislation, Council might go there. But neither DPER nor we have the authority to constructively amend KCC 21A.30.085.J and insert alcohol-related businesses after marijuana-related businesses on the list of prohibited home occupations. We do not get to "add words where the legislature has chosen not to include them." *Nelson v. Department of Labor & Industries*, 198 Wn. App. 101, 110, 392 P.3d 1138 (2017).

22. In addition to the massive-scale crowds DPER claims could follow our unfavorable decision, DPER argues that while commercial breweries are limited to a combined brewery/tasting area of 3,500 square feet, nothing would prevent Appellants from constructing over 3,500 square feet of brewery/tasting in connection to a home occupation business. Ex. D1 at 006. However, a square footage that exceeded (or even approached) the maximum square footage of a full-scale (as the primary use of a property) would not qualify as a "limited-scale" endeavor (as an accessory use of a residential property).

23. As discussed above, either the KCC 21A.06.013 and .610 definitions act as an actual check, or they do not. If they do not, then Appellants can do whatever they want so long as they meet all the enumerated parts of KCC 21A.30.085. Because we conclude that these definitions are operative, they are checks on the extreme examples DPER presents. And to the extent DPER has experience that such checks are insufficient for keeping particular subcategories of home occupations from expanding inappropriately or creating undue neighborhood controversy, it should (as it is done here) propose adding these to KCC 21A.30.085.J's and .080.E's lists of uses ineligible for home occupation treatment.

24. In addition to the "limited-scale" check from KCC 21A.06.610 discussed above, .013.C requires that an accessory use be "subordinate and incidental to the principal use." A large-scale tasting area would not be subordinate (having a lower or less important position) and incidental (accompanying but not a major part of) to the principal use of the property as a residence. In general, the examples DPER presents for how large Appellants' business could grow sound less like a commercial use subordinate and incidental to a residential use, and more like a primary commercial use with some subordinate and incidental on-site housing for employees. That the latter would be disallowed does not mean that no tasting area could be permissible.[2]

25. DPER argues that because fully-outdoor tasting operations would not necessarily require a permit from DPER, DPER would not necessarily have any mechanism to ensure that businesses are subordinate and incidental to the primary residential use. Ex. A16 at 004. The same could be said for a whole host of home occupations, beyond adult beverages,

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[2] DPER points to KCC 21A.06.013.A's requirement that an accessory use be "[c]ustomarily associated with a principal use." DPER is correct that allowing customers to purchase and consume beverages on site is not customarily associated with a residence. But neither is brewing beer for sale on site, a use DPER agrees can (if property limited) qualify as a legal home occupation. We can think of a host of other home occupation businesses that are not "customarily associated" with a residential use. This general requirement would, if broadly interpreted, completely swamp KCC 21A.30.080 and .085.

that are not on KCC 21A.30.080.E's and 085.J's prohibited lists. More importantly, the Code Enforcement program is DPER's existing mechanism for ensuring that, even where a permit is not required, a use does not violate the code's limits. In fact, DPER actually has an open (but stayed) enforcement case on the subject property.

26. That does not mean that the already over-stretched Code Enforcement program provides an ideal review mechanism going forward. Proposed ordinance 2018-0241 provides regulatory and licensing for small-scale and very small-scale production facilities—including extensive provisions regarding tasting areas. Without offering any commentary on those *specific* provisions, it makes sense to handle small/limited-scale adult beverage operations via some system of reviewable permits and licenses, instead of relying on a catch-all provision for limited-scale uses often reviewable only after neighborhood tensions boil over to the point a complaint is lodged. Yet that does not give us the leeway to interpret the current code to have already accomplished this. Instead, our role is to interpret the codes "as they are written, and not as we would like them to be written." *Brown v. State*, 155 Wn.2d 254, 268, 119 P.3d 341 (2005) (citations omitted).

27. DPER is correct that Appellants' initial tasting room plans went far beyond a limited-scale service activity subordinate to the primary use of the site as a residence, and also violated some specific prohibitions, such as KCC 21A.30.085.I's hours of operations. Appellants advertised that their location would be "great for big gatherings" and "could fit over 80 vehicles." Ex. D7. That is way beyond a limited-scale home occupation. Viewing the aerial map with significant outdoor seating, DPER analogizing Appellants' past operational capacity to a "beer garden" seems accurate. Ex. D4. Even under Appellants' somewhat scaled-back scenario, they testified that they still have seating for 28 patrons at any given time. This would far exceed the number of customers one would expect from the four allowable, additional vehicles referenced in KCC 21A.30.085.H.3.[3] Appellants did not challenge DPER's assertion that the square footage Appellants devoted to tasting and customer parking combined are larger than the house itself.[4]

28. But that is not our basic question. Instead, we are reviewing DPER's determination that tasting rooms adjacent to a home occupation brewery are simply not allowed as home occupations, *period*, essentially adding tasting areas to KCC 21A.30.085.J's list of uses prohibited from achieving home occupation status. As noted above, we must reject DPER's position unless there are no set of circumstances in which a tasting area can meet the home occupation standards. We can certainly envisions such circumstances—a home occupation brewery with capacity for only a few carloads of customers to come, purchase and consume samples, and then purchase growlers to take off–site—that could meet this. To this extent, we grant Appellants' challenge.

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[3] Even assuming that vehicles bringing customers to the site would have more than the American average of 1.2 to 1.3 people-per-vehicle, http://overflow.solutions/demographic-data/how-many-people-are-there-per-automobile-in-the-us/, accommodations for 28 customers anticipates far more than four additional vehicles on site at any one time.

[4] Although there was no testimony on how much total outdoor area was devoted to the business, a quick eyeball of the maps appears to show this in excess of the 998 square feet allowed for a property of the subject parcel's size. KCC 21A.30.085.C.2.

29. We deny Appellants' challenge in that they will need to significantly scale back. Looking forward, DPER raises some good points, such as how Appellants—situated in proximity to Pacific Raceways—can structure operations so that they do not increase the average vehicular traffic by more than four additional vehicles at any given time. KCC 21A.30.085.H.3. But those are "as-applied" issues specific to Appellants' actual operations, reviewable through either the building permit or Code Enforcement review processes, and ultimately via an appeal to the Examiner. They do not create a "facial" bar to every home occupation tasting area in King County.

30. Finally, a word about vested rights. DPER states that because its *interpretation* of the code (as creating a blanket bar to tasting areas as home occupations) was in place prior to Appellants' operations starting up, Appellants are not vested. Ex. A16 at 001. Vesting relates to the right to have a proposal processed under "regulations" in effect at the time an application is submitted. *See Snohomish County v. Pollution Control Hearings Board*, 187 Wn. 2d 346, 358, 386 P.3d 1064 (2016). While our code is more generous (to developers) than state law in terms of what applications are covered by the doctrine, our local vesting statute still pegs the analysis to the "land use control ordinances." KCC 20.20.070.A. An agency interpretation of an ordinance, even if correct, is not an actual ordinance. In any event, DPER's interpretation (that KCC 21A.30.085 bars every on-site tasting area for products brewed on site) is incorrect.

31. In our prehearing order, we referenced the pending code change that would make a brewery/tasting room like Appellants' illegal. We observed that it would waste everyone's time for Appellants to rush submit a second application for DPER to review and (given its consistent legal position) deny, for Appellants to file a second appeal, and for us to start processing a second appeal, solely to protect against the scenario that in between then and the time we issued today's decision, the code would change. We noted that we would consider Appellants' tasting room "vested" to today's code, if we require them to re-apply.

32. The code still has not changed, so there is no need to look backwards. Quite apart from whether a tasting area is allowed, we were slightly surprised to see that the plans did not seem to include any reference to a tasting area, such as where on the site map such tasting would occur.[5] That could be problematic for Appellants. Vesting does not apply to "potential, but unexpressed, use[s] the owner desires." *Alliance Inv. Group of Ellensburg, LLC v. City of Ellensburg*, 189 Wn. App. 763, 772, 358 P.3d 1227 (2015) (*interpreting Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County*, 133 Wn.2d 269, 943 P.2d 1378 (1997)). To be protected, Appellants should lay out a specific tasting area(s) in their next submittal.

33. As to that next submittal, both DPER's and Appellants' post-hearing briefs discuss what type of occupancy (B versus F) applies. DPER acknowledged an earlier mistake. Ex. A16-003. Appellants seem to treat DPER's initial categorization as binding. Ex. A16-003. That would likely be true if DPER had issued an actual permit and later (after the appeal window closed) tried to rescind that permit. *Cf. Chelan County v. Nykreim*, 146 Wn.2d 904,

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[5] We understood Appellants' contention that their state license entitled them to have a tasting room as part of brewery operations, but we did not understand that tasting areas would not even be shown on a site map (the same way, for example, that something like a driveway would).

926, 932, 52 P.3d 1 (2002). *Contra City of Mercer Island v. Steinmann*, 9 Wn. App. 479, 481-83, 513 P.2d 80 (1973). But that is not our scenario.

34. DPER's argument that it reviews a tasting area (where the public gathers) under different standards than a manufacturing area makes some logical sense, but we do not decide the correct coding. DPER should process the application correctly, consistent with today's decision. And if DPER initially mis-categorized the project, and if it performed work it would not have under the proper categorization, then those hours should be credited to Appellants' account. But a mistake in DPER's initial analysis does not entitle Appellants to have their application continue to be processed incorrectly.

35. If—either during DPER's processing of Appellants' revised application or thereafter—the code changes to outlaw the type of activities Appellants want to conduct, that change would not make Appellants' use illegal, only a legal nonconforming use. On the negative side, legal nonconforming use status comes with some restrictions, such as allowable modifications and expansions. KCC 21A.32.020–.085. On the positive side, Appellants would enjoy decreased competition, as no similarly situated, would-be rival business could subsequently open up. Regardless, a code change would not retroactively outlaw Appellants' operations, so long as Appellants' have resubmitted something showing a limited-scale brewery/tasting area subordinate and incidental to the principal use of the property as a residence and meeting the other requirements of KCC 21A.30.085, prior to the code change becoming effective.

DECISION:

1. Appellants' appeal is DENIED, in the sense that Appellants' tasting room activities exceed that allowed under the home occupancy requirements.

2. Appellants' appeal is GRANTED, in that DPER's interpretation that the current code bars tasting areas for home occupancy breweries, across the board, is incorrect.

ORDERED October 3, 2018.

David Spohr
Hearing Examiner

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

King County Code 20.22.040 directs the Examiner to make the County's final decision for this type of case. This decision shall be final and conclusive unless proceedings for review of the decision are timely and properly commenced in superior court. Appeals are governed by the Land Use Petition Act, Chapter 36.70C RCW.

MINUTES OF THE SEPTEMBER 6, 2018, HEARING IN THE APPEAL OF FOUR HORSEMEN BREWERY, DEPARTMENT OF PERMITTING AND ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW FILE NO. PREA170313

David Spohr was the Hearing Examiner in this matter. Participating in the hearing were Dane Scarimbolo, Jake Tracy, Dominique Torgerson, and Justin Torgerson.

The following exhibits were offered and entered into the record:

Department-offered exhibits:

Exhibit no. D1	Department of Permitting and Environmental Review staff report to the Hearing Examiner for file no. PREA170313
Exhibit no. D2	Pre-application preliminary determination, dated June 1, 2018
Exhibit no. D3	Notice and statement of appeal, received July 2, 2018
Exhibit no. D4	Aerial map of subject property
Exhibit no. D5	Excerpts of Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board notice of liquor license applications
Exhibit no. D6	"Four Horsemen Brewery Opens This Weekend" article from Washington Beer Blog, dated August 5, 2016
Exhibit no. D7	Four Horsemen website
Exhibit no. D8	DPER file no. PREA170313
Exhibit no. D9	Washington Administrative Code 314-20-015
Exhibit no. D10	Email from Howard Esping to Sara Smith, dated June 11, 2018

Appellant-offered exhibits:

Exhibit no. A1	Washington State Liquor Control Board notice of liquor license application, dated February 19, 2014;
Exhibit no. A2	Letter from Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board, dated November 6, 2017; and Internal DPER emails, dated November 7, 2017
Exhibit no. A3	Email correspondence between Dominique Torgerson and DPER
Exhibit no. A4	King County Codes
Exhibit no. A5	Revised Codes of Washington
Exhibit no. A6	Traffic counts from 2013 through 2017
Exhibit no. A7	"100% Made in Washington" article by Larry Clark in Washington State Magazine, dated Fall 2017
Exhibit no. A8	King County Comprehensive Plan 2017; Occupational Safety and Health Administrative 5813
Exhibit no. A9	Code enforcement case no. ENFR170930 record details
Exhibit no. A10	Schedule of standard building construction values, dated February 6, 2018
Exhibit no. A11	Permit no. ADDC180462 summary of charges, dated June 29, 2018
Exhibit no. A12	KCC 27.10.020 and KCC 27.10.320
Exhibit no. A13	Discussion of King County Comprehensive Plan
Exhibit no. A14	WAC 314-02-035; RCW 66.40.010, RCW 66.40.020, RCW 66.40.030, RCW 66.40.040, RCW 66.40.100, RCW 66.08.200
Exhibit no. A15	Appellants' rebuttal to DPER staff report

The following exhibit was offered and entered into the record on September 13, 2018:

Department-offered exhibit:
Exhibit no. D11 DPER's response to Appellant's rebuttal

The following exhibit was offered and entered into the record on September 17, 2018:

Appellant-offered exhibit:
Exhibit no. A16 Appellants' reply to DPER's response

DS/ld

October 3, 2018

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

SUBJECT: Department of Permitting and Environmental Review file no. **PREA170313**

FOUR HORSEMEN BREWERY
Preliminary Determination Appeal

I, Vonetta Mangaoang, certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that I transmitted the **REPORT AND DECISION** to those listed on the attached page as follows:

☒ EMAILED to all County staff listed as parties/interested persons and parties with e-mail addresses on record.

☒ placed with the United States Postal Service, with sufficient postage, as FIRST CLASS MAIL in an envelope addressed to the non-County employee parties/interested persons to addresses on record.

DATED October 3, 2018.

Vonetta Mangaoang

Vonetta Mangaoang
Senior Administrator